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Political Violence and the Mediating Role of Violent Extremist
Propensities
Abstract
Research into violent extremism is lacking integrated theoretical frameworks explaining
individual involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence, resulting in a poor
understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, the current
study moves beyond the dominant risk factor approach and proposes an integrated model
for the explanation of political/religious violence, distinguishing between direct
mechanisms and “causes of the causes.” The model integrates mechanisms from different
but complementary traditions. Following previous work, this study focusses on the causes
of the causes influencing direct key mechanisms, violent extremist propensity, and
exposure to violent extremist moral settings that explain political/religious violence. The
theoretical model is tested using structural equation modelling. The analyses are based on
a web survey (N = 6,020) among adolescents and young adults in Belgium. Results show
that violent extremist propensity and exposure to violent extremist moral settings have
direct effects on the likelihood of political/religious violence. These direct mechanisms are
in turn determined by a series of exogenous factors: perceived injustice and poor social
integration. The relationship between perceived injustice and poor social integration and
political/religious violence is further mediated by perceived alienation, perceived
procedural justice, and religious authoritarianism. The implications of these findings are
discussed.
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Introduction
Violent extremism is a widely discussed topic in both mainstream journals
and academia and has been high on the international agenda ever since
the events of 9/11. Recent events, such as the attack in Paris, the Buddhist
killing of Muslims in Myanmar, and the growing extreme right violence in
response to increasing migration, are just some examples that illustrate
how the dynamics of violent radicalization can have dramatic
consequences. Violent extremism can manifest as politically and/or
religiously motivated violence.
Although considerable research has been conducted on violent extremism,
the domain is still lacking overarching theoretical frameworks.1 The
existing theoretical frameworks are somewhat fragmented and poorly
integrated, and research often does not move beyond the reporting of risk
and protective factors.2 As a result, the increased attention to violent
extremism has not resulted in a better understanding of relevant causal
mechanisms nor has it led to an integration of different explanatory
levels.3 In criminology, similar concerns have led to a renewed interest in
the development of cross-level integrated theories that are internally
coherent and consist of clear, substantive logical argumentation on direct
and indirect mechanisms in the explanation of (adolescent) offending.4
We argue that research in the domain of violent extremism will equally
benefit from theoretical reflections and theoretical reconsiderations of the
relevant risk factors: It is crucial that scholars ask themselves which risk
factors should be considered of explanatory value and why (i.e., is there a

Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science
Theory,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:4 (2011a): 7-36; Randy Borum,
“Radicalization Into Violent Extremism: A Review of Conceptual Models and
Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:4 (2011b): 37-62; Kris
Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A
Systematic Review of the Research Evidence,” Youth Justice Board for England and
Wales, 2012; Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why Conventional
Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse,” International
Affairs 86:4 (2010): 889-901.
2 Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as
Moral Action,” University College London, 2008.
3 Ibid; Per-Olof H. Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime,” in
Roy D. King and Emma Wincup (eds.), Doing Research on Crime and Justice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Explaining Crime as
Moral Actions,” in Steven Hitlin and Stephen Vaisey (eds.), Handbook of the
Sociology of Morality (New York: Springer, 2010), 211-239.
4 Lieven Pauwels and Robert Svensson, “Violent Youth Group Involvement, Selfreported Offending and Victimization: An Empirical Assessment of an Integrated
Informal Control/Lifestyle Model,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research 19:4 (2013): 369-386.
1
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mechanism that links the factor with the outcome, and if so, what are the
contributory intervening mechanisms?).5
In order to take a first step to fill this gap, we propose an integrated
theoretical framework explaining political/religious violence as the
behavioral component of violent extremism.6 According to Schmid,
violent extremism can best be defined as opposing dominant political
positions and core (social or religious) values of the society it is part of,
leaving no place for pluralism and always accepting violence as a means to
achieve the group’s goals. This can manifest as violent attitudes, violent
actions (political/religious violence), or both. 7
The integrated model we propose focuses on theoretical integration to
differentiate between exogenous factors (causes of the causes) and direct
mechanisms.8 Building on a contemporary integrated theory of crime
causation, i.e., situational action theory (SAT),9 we integrate mechanisms
derived from different criminological frameworks and apply these ideas to
the explanation of political/religious violence. Our framework integrates
an explanatory model that is capable of explaining why individuals come
to see political/religious violence as an action alternative and an
explanatory model that is capable of explaining why some kinds of
individuals who see political/religious violence as an action alternative are
triggered to carry out such actions. We will refer to these theoretical
models as the social (developmental) model and the situational model,

Deflem, Mathieu, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives
(Bingley: Emerald Group, 2004).
6 Pauwels, Lieven, Fabienne Brion, Nele Schils, Julianne Laffineur, Antoinette
Verhage, Brice De Ruyver, and Marleen Easton, Explaining and Understanding the
Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism: An Integrative
Quantitative and Qualitative Approach. (Gent: Academia Press, 2014).
7 In our integrated framework these violent attitudes are conceptualized as “extremist
propensity” and political/religious violence is the dependent variable. For some wellknown descriptions of the violent radicalization process leading to violent extremism,
distinguishing between extremist attitudes or ideas and violent extremist behavior,
see (among others) McCauley and Moskalenko’s two-pyramid model and
Moghaddam’s staircase model. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko,
“Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways to Terrorism,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 653-673; Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to
Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60:2 (2005): 161169; Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A
Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” ICC Research Paper (Den Haag:
International Centre for Counter Terrorism, 2010); Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of
Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22:4
(2010): 479-494.
8 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence,” in Wilhem Heitmeyer and
John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research (New York:
Springer, 2003), 399-436.
9 Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory,” in
Gianluca Manzo (ed.), Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 2014).
5
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respectively. Although different aspects of this integrated model have
been discussed elsewhere and some hypotheses have been tested, a
detailed analysis of the full structural equation model has not been
conducted.10
This study builds upon previous work and provides a detailed analysis,
focusing on the social (developmental) model and the emergence of
political/religious violence. As our model aims to offer a general
explanation of violent extremism, and political/religious violence more
specifically, right-wing, left-wing, and Islamist extremism are addressed
simultaneously. Also, no further distinction is made between political and
religious violence as we will define politically and/or religiously motivated
violence as moral rule breaching as stated in the law, regardless of
ideological background or motivation.11

In Need of an Integrated Approach to Violent Extremism
Research on violent radicalization and violent extremism has resulted in a
long and still expanding list of risk factors possibly leading to violent
extremism and the use of political/religious violence, depending on the
individual and the setting.12 However, such a risk factor approach is not
capable of distinguishing between real causal mechanisms and mere
correlates, causing confusion about what is and is not of importance.13
Although risk factors are stable correlates that indicate the possibility of a
certain outcome, only a number of them can rightly be interpreted as
directly causal; the majority cannot. So far, scholars have not been able to
agree on a general causal model of violent extremism.14 There is
disagreement on the relative importance of different levels of explanation

Schils, Nele, and Lieven Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by
Gender and Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework,” Journal of
Strategic Security 7:3 (2014): 27–47; Pauwels, Lieven, and Nele Schils, “Differential
Online Exposure to Extremist Content and Political Violence: Testing the Relative
Strength of Social Learning and Competing Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political
Violence 28:1 (2016):1–29.
11 See also Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of
Religious Violence (Oakland: Univeristy of California Press, 2003). Religion can
provide an identity that is strong and easy to appeal to as well as a specific and unique
set of transcendent moral justifications and symbols that make violence acceptable
and therefore possible. However, the goal this violence has to serve is often (socio-)
political (e.g., a society based on Sharia law) in nature and religious and political
ideologies are often intertwined (e.g., religious nationalism).
12 Bjørgo Tore, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns,
Perpetrators and Responses (Oslo: Ascehoug, 1997); Horgan, John, The Psychology
of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2014).
13 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I;” John Horgan, “From Profiles to
Pathways, from Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into
Terrorism,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
681:1 (2008): 80-94.
14 Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.”
10
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(individual and environment); correlation is misinterpreted as causation;
and causal powers are sometimes ascribed to mere background
characteristics (e.g., gender, origin, race, etc.). There is also discussion
among scholars on distant versus proximate mechanisms.
This situation is almost identical to what can be found in the field of
criminal and deviant behavior of adolescents,15 which is equally criticized
for being stuck in a risk factor approach as a consequence of poor
understanding of causal mechanisms and the lack of integration.16
Subsequently, in the last fifteen years, there has been a renewed attention
within criminology to integrated theories that aim at internal coherence
and clear substantive argumentation on the direct and indirect causes of
crime.17 Theoretical integration has often been refuted because of the fact
that different theories were built on different assumptions about social
order and human nature. However, most theories of crime causation are
based on outdated images of human nature (e.g., the nature–nurture
discussion), and therefore conceptual end-to-end integration between
various incompatibly labeled theoretical frameworks becomes viable
again.18 If we focus on complementarity rather than differences between
competing theories, theoretical integration can be thought of as an
opportunity to build more comprehensive and solid theories producing
scientific progress.
We believe integration has merits as long as it is built around an internal
causal logic, i.e., logically distinguishing between proximate and distant
factors. This implicates that it is necessary to gain insight into both the
direct causes of offending and into the role of exogenous factors or indirect

David P. Farrington, “Human Development and Criminal Careers,” in Mike
McGuire, Robert Morgan, and Ron Rainer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Criminology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); David P. Farrington, “Childhood Risk
Factors and Risk-Focused Prevention,” in Mike McGuire, Robert Morgan, and Ron
Rainer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (ed. 4) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 602-640.; Loeber, Rolf and David P. Farrington (eds.),
Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998).
16 Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime.”
17 David P. Farrington, Robert J. Sampson, and Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Integrating
Individuals and Ecological Aspects of Crime,” Revised papers presented at a
workshop held in Johannesburg, Sweden, (Stockholm: National Council for Crime
prevention, 1992); Messner, F. Steven, Marvin D. Krohn, and Allen E. Liska (eds.),
Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime: Problems and
Prospects (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Wikström H. Per-Olof
and Sampson J. Robert, The Explanation of Crime: Context, Mechanisms and
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
18 Laub John H. and Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives:
Delinquent Boys to Age 70 (Harvard: University Press, 2003); Laub John H. and
Robert J. Sampson, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning points Through
Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
15
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causes (causes of the causes).19 Wikström proposed that such integration
should be built around a “developed theory of (moral) action through
which levels of explanation can be integrated and factor’s status as
potential causes can be assessed.”20 The integrated framework to study
individual differences in political violence that we propose is built on the
principle of end-to-end integration. End-to-end integration entails the
integration of mechanisms that play a role in different theories so that the
dependent variables of some theories become the independent variables of
the integrated theory.21 It draws upon one of the most promising
etiological theories of our time, the situational action theory,22 and applies
its philosophy to the explanation of violent extremism, and more
specifically, to political/religious violence.

Applying the Logic of Situational Action Theory
Situational action theory (SAT) is a general theory of offending and aims at
providing fundamental insight into the causal processes (mechanisms)
leading to acts of crime, or more generally, moral rule breaking. It is an
integrative theory, combining contextual and individual theories from
different traditions.23
SAT is formulated as an “action theory” or an abstract account of what
moves people to action, or more specifically crime, in certain
circumstances or situations. SAT defines crime as acts of breaking moral
rules as stated in the law.24 Regardless of content, what all crimes have in
common is that they break the law. SAT takes the standpoint that this
process of rule breaking is the same for all crimes, making a general
explanation of crime possible. By identifying acts of crime as the breaching
of moral rules as stated in the criminal law, conceptual discussions

Wikström and Sampson, The Explanation of Crime.
Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime;” Wikström,
“Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Opp, D. Karl, Theories of Political Protest and
Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique and Synthesis (New
York: Routledge, 2009).
21Messner, Krohn and Liska, Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and
Crime.
22 Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.”
23 Recent studies of adolescent offending offered empirical evidence for important
elements of the theory. See Olena Antonaccio and Charles R. Tittle, “Morality, SelfControl and Crime,” Criminology 46 (2008): 497-510; Robert Svensson and Dietrich
Oberwittler, “It’s Not the Time They Spend, It’s What They Do. The Interaction
Between Delinquent Friends and Unstructured Routine Activity on Delinquency:
Findings From Two Countries,” Journal of Criminal Justice 38:5 (2010): 1006-1014;
Per-Olof H. Wikström and Robert Svensson, “Why Are English Youths More Violent
than Swedish Youths? A Comparative Study of the Role of Crime Propensity,
Lifestyles and Their Interactions,” European Journal of Criminology 5 (2008): 309330.
24 Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions.”
19

20
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become dispensable. The explanation of crime lies in the question
regarding why individuals breach moral rules when they know it is against
the law to do so. The focus lies on the breaking of the moral rule, and not
on the moral rule itself. Moral rules are indeed different in time and place,
but that is not the issue when general explanations are sought of the
process of law-breaking. Therefore, what differs between types of crime is
not the explanatory process but the content of the offence. The same is
true for political/religious violence.
All expressions of political/religious violence refer to the violation of
criminal law.25 Defining political/religious violence as another form of
moral rule breaking, as stated in the law, has the advantage that all forms
of political/religious violence are the same and thus this approach avoids
conflicting perceptions and definitions. The focus lies on the fact that the
moral rule as defined in law is breached and not on the validity of the
moral rule or the righteousness of breaching it. 26 Furthermore, this
reasoning provides the possibility of a general explanation of violent
extremism, focusing on common pathways toward political/religious
violence. Whether or not political/religious violence is committed out of
different ideological or religious motivations, and whether or not the
violence is perceived as just or not, it is all violence committed to breach
the existing status quo; likewise, it all involves breaking moral rules as
stated in the law.
By defining political/religious violence this way, the philosophy of SAT can
be applied to the explanation of political/religious violence (Figure 1).
Research into different, and essentially criminological, frameworks has
already demonstrated their applicability to the explanation of
political/religious violence. Using the SAT framework, other frameworks
can be integrated to explain political/religious violence.

Bouhana and Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism;” Per-Olof Wikström and Kyle H.
Treiber, “Violence as Situational Action,” International Journal of Conflict and
Violence 3:1 (2009): 75-96.
26 This definition is in line with Schmid who states that to resolve confusion and end
endless debates on what can and cannot be considered extremist, a benchmark is
needed, best defined in relation to mainstream political activities and core values or
moral rules. See Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Borum,
“Radicalization Into Violent Extremism I;” Schmid, “Radicalisation, DeRadicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature
Review;” Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,”
Terrorism and Political Violence.
25
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Figure 1: The SAT Framework, Which Explains Violent
Extremism (Political/Religious Violence)

Exposure to
extremist settings

Background
characteristics

VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
(political violence)

Emergence

Extremist
propensity

Social (Developmental)
Framework

Situational Framework

The theory is constructed around two main parts: A situational model and
a social (developmental) model.27 The situational model focusses on the
situational mechanism explaining why individuals actually commit acts of
political/religious violence in a given situation.28 It explains how the
interaction between individual propensity toward violent extremism and
exposure to violent extremist moral settings determines a perceptionchoice process that can lead to political/religious violence. Given the
circumstances, individuals perceive a number of action alternatives and
choose to carry out one of these alternatives based on their own propensity
and the characteristics of their setting. SAT regards elements of, and
interaction between, propensity and exposure as the direct causes of
political/religious violence because they initiate the perception-choice
process and thus can move individuals to carry out acts of
political/religious violence.29
The social (developmental) model focuses on triggering mechanisms30 and
explains how individuals develop violent extremist propensities, how
settings acquire a violent extremist character, and how specific individuals
become exposed to violent extremist settings. The exogenous factors

Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.”
In SAT, a situation refers to a specific combination of an individual in a certain
setting.
29 Wikström, In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime; Sedgwick, “The
Concept of Radicalization.”
30 More specifically, social and developmental mechanisms.
27

28
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initiating these mechanisms are what criminologists often refer to as the
“causes of the causes.”
Based on this framework, we developed an integrated model for the
explanation of violent extremism in the form of politically and/or
religiously motivated violence (Figure 2). This model distinguishes
between the personal and environmental interaction (direct mechanisms)
on the one hand and triggering mechanisms (causes of the causes) on the
other hand. The situational model of the theory has previously been tested
and the results indicated that the role of exposure to violent extremist
settings in political/religious violence is strongly conditional on one’s level
of violent extremist propensity. This finding holds across groups by
gender and origin.31 Therefore, the current article focuses on establishing
the relationship between exogenous factors and violent extremist moral
beliefs and the ability to exercise self-control on the one hand and the
mediating role of both dimensions of violent extremist propensity in
exposure to violent extremist moral settings and self-reported
political/religious violence on the other hand.
Figure 2: Testable Integrated Model for the Explanation of
Political/Religious Violence32

Religious
Authoritarianism

Self-Control
Perceived Injustice

Perceived Alienation

Political/Religious
Violence

Extremist Moral
Beliefs

Social Integration
Elements of
Legitimacy

Exposure to
Extremist Moral
Settings

Elements of the integrated model
Schils and Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by Gender and
Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework.”
32 Our model focusses on the explanation of political/religious violence and not on the
explanation of why individuals join violent extremist groups or movements. It is
highly plausible that some overlap exists between both explanations, but they
certainly are different. We refer to the work of Karl-Dieter Opp for a discussion on
insurgent group activities. Opp’s model has partially inspired us. Opp, Karl-Dieter,
Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 2009).
31
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Extremist propensity
Violent extremist propensity refers to the general tendency of individuals
to support and perceive political/religious violence as a valid action
alternative. This is essentially determined by a person’s morality and the
ability to exercise self-control.33 Violent extremist moral beliefs refer to
the extent to which individuals hold a positive attitude toward the use of
violence to obtain political or religious goals. The ability to exercise selfcontrol refers to one’s ability to resist temptation and provocation and is
formed by several individual traits, such as impulsiveness, immediate
gratification, the lack of anger management, and thrill-seeking behavior.34
Several studies on violent extremism have revealed that thrill-seeking
behavior is often observed in violent extremists.35

Exposure to violent extremism
Exposure to violent extremist moral settings can be characterized as the
time present in settings that are conducive to political/religious violence.36
Extremist settings make the cultural transmission of violent extremist
values possible through processes of signaling and social learning.37 A
setting’s level of violent extremism is determined by the moral rules of the
setting regarding violent extremism and the use of political/religious
violence and the enforcement of these rules.38 In SAT, both elements
should be taken into account; it is the person–moral environment
interaction that explains crime, and in this case political/religious
violence. This has been documented by Schils and Pauwels.39

Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.”
Gottfredson Michael R. and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1990); Harold G. Grasmick, Charles R. Title, Robert J.
Bursik, and Bruce J. Arneklev, “Testing the Core Empirical Implications of
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime,” Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 30:1 (1993): 5-29; Per-Olof H. Wikström and Kyle Treiber, “The
Role of Self-Control in Crime Causation Beyond Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General
Theory of Crime,” European Journal of Criminology 4:2 (2007): 237-264.
35 Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence; Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The
Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social
Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23:4 (2011): 602-622; Jeff
Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological
Approaches,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:1 (2005): 3-42.
36 Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.”
37 Ronald L. Akers and Adam Silverman, “Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence
and Terrorism,” in Margaret A. Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson
(eds.), Violence, From Theory to Research (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015).
38 Bouhana and Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism.”
39 Schils and Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by Gender and
Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework.”
33

34
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Perceived injustice
Perceived injustice refers to the feeling of being treated unfairly by society
in comparison to others. Agnew’s general theory of strains (GST) argues
that strain, or negative treatment by others, leads to negative feelings that
may lead to a number of behavioral, cognitive, and emotional outcomes,
including violent attitudes and behavior.40 Agnew identifies perceptions
of injustice and discrimination as important stressors.41 Many theories of
(violent) extremism refer to perceived injustice as a triggering factor that
helps to create a cognitive opening, i.e., makes people susceptible to
violent extremist messages.42

Social integration
Some factors, such as commitment to school and attachment to parents,
can reduce the negative outcome of strains.43 Control theories have
traditionally pointed out the importance of social bonds to society to keep
individuals from offending.44 The central argument is that individuals
who have weak ties experience fewer constraints to deviate. Social bonds
accumulate over life-domains, and previous research has demonstrated
the strong cumulative effects of a lack of social bonds.45 Sampson and
Laub redefined social bonds in terms of social capital.46 They argue that
the social control following from participation in conventional networks
and activities protects individuals from committing crime. Likewise, high
Agnew, Robert, Pressured Into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of
Terrorism,” Theoretical Criminology 14:2 (2010): 131-153.
41 Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory Approach to Violence” in Margaret A.
Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson (eds.), Violence: From Theory to
Research (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015).
42 King and Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists;” Clark McCauley
and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways to
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 415-433; Collin Mellis,
“Amsterdam and Radicalization: The Municipal Approach,” Radicalization in a
Broader Perspective (Den Haag: NCTb, 2007); Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The
Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60:2
(2005): 234-256; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and
Radical Islam,” Paper Presented at the Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference (Yale,
2004).
43 Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Crime;” Merry Morash and Boyongook Moon,
“Gender Differences in the Effects of Strain on the Delinquency of South Korean
Youth,” Youth and Society 38:3 (2007): 300-321.
44 Hirschi, Travis, Causes of Delinquency (Oakland: University of California Press,
1969); Walter C. Reckless, “New Theory of Delinquency and Crime,” A Fed. Probation
25:42 (1961).
45 Terence P. Thornberry, “Toward an Interactional Theory of Delinquency,”
Criminology 24:4 (1987): 863-887.; Terrence P. Thornberry, “Reflections on the
Advantages and Disadvantages of Theoretical Integration,” in Steven M. Messner,
Marvan D. Krohn, and Allen E. Liska, Theoretical Integration in the Study of
Deviance and Crime: Problems and Prospects (Albany: Sate University of New York
Press, 1989); Laub and Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives.
46 Laub and Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives.
40
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levels of social integration, or strong social bonds with parents and school,
may decrease the chances of committing political/religious violence.

Perceived alienation (political powerlessness)
Confronted with perceived injustice (strains) and a lack of social bonds,
individuals might begin to feel distanced or alienated from society and can
develop the perception of not belonging.47 In his study on personal
alienation, Srole describes personal anomia as the individual experience of
social disconnection and disintegration, which traces its origin to social
and personality factors. 48 It refers more specifically to a breakdown of the
individual’s sense of attachment to society.49 Anomic individuals often
experience feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Srole found that
anomic individuals are more likely to have negative attitudes toward
outgroups. Strains and poor social ties can contribute to feelings of
powerlessness. Some empirical studies have linked feelings of (political)
powerlessness to violent extremist ideology.50

Perceived procedural justice and police legitimacy
Analogous to social bonds theory, procedural justice theory (PJT)
examines why people conform to the law.51 Just like Laub and Sampson’s
theory of social capital, PJT accepts the thesis that controls can be
weakened by structural constraints situated at the institutional level, e.g.,
the unfair treatment of individuals by the police and authorities.
Perceived procedural justice and legitimacy may well be affected by social
integration and perceived injustice.
According to PJT, the perception of the legitimacy of the social and
political system in general, and the authorities that represent that system
more specifically, depends on the perception of procedural justice based
on the assessment of the authorities 1) to be just and fair in their decision
making; and 2) to treat civilians with dignity and respect.52 If so, in
Michael J. Mazarr, “The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” Policy
Review 125 (2004): 39-60.
48 Leo Srole, “Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study,”
American Sociological Review 21:6 (1956): 709-716. Srole departs form Durkheims’
macro-sociological concept of anomy and translates it into a broader concept of
individual dysfunction and malintegration in social systems. This is in fact more in
line with Merton’s conceptualization of anomy.
49 See also MacIver, Robert M, The Ramparts We Guard (London: MacMillan, 1950).
50 Peer Scheepers, Albert Felling, and Jan Peters, “Anomie, Authoritarianism and
Ethnocentrism: Update of a Classic Theme and Empirical Test,” Politics & the
Individual (1992); Roy, “Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: the Power of a
Narrative.”
51 Tom R. Tyler, “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,” Annual
Review of Psychology 57:1 (2006): 375-400; Tyler Tom R., Why People Obey the
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
52 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law.
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addition to perceiving the authorities as legitimate and thus to be obeyed,
individuals will also perceive them as sharing the same norms and
values.53 Empirical research has shown that those who distrust the
authorities are more likely to engage in crime and political/religious
violence.54
Doosje, Loseman, and Van den Bos describe elements of perceived
alienation and weak perceived legitimacy of authorities as important
elements of a radical belief system that individuals develop in response to
certain strains and insecurities, such as perceived injustice.55 In turn,
these elements influence the individual’s morality concerning violent
extremism and subsequently the use of political/religious violence.

Religious authoritarianism
The concept of authoritarianism was developed by Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, and Sanford as a relatively stable personal
characteristic resulting from negative experiences during childhood that
lead to intrapersonal conflict.56 In his view, authoritarian individuals are
quick to perceive others, especially from other (minority) groups, as weak
or immoral.57 Following conceptual and operational criticism, Altemeyer
later conceptualized authoritarianism as a set of coherent learned attitudes
rather than a stable intrapersonal characteristic.58 The following three
elements characterize authoritarian individuals: 1) conventionalism; 2) an
emphasis on hierarchy and submission to authority; and 3) a “law and
order mentality,” which legitimizes anger and aggression against those

Jonathan Jackson, Ben Hough, Mike Myhill, Andy Quinton, and Tom Tyler, “Why
Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions,”
British Journal of Criminology 52:6 (2012): 1051-1071; Tom R. Tyler and Jason
Sunshine, “Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community and the Importance
of Procedural Justice. The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s Moral
Values,” Social Psychology Quarterly 66:2 (2003): 153-165.
54 Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism;
Maarten DeWaele and Lieven Pauwels, “Youth Involvement in Politically Motivated
Violence: Why do Social Integration, Perceived legitimacy and Perceived
Discrimination Matter?,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 8:1
(2014):134-153.
55 Bert-Jan Doosje, Annemarie Loseman, and Kees Van den Bos, “Determinants of the
Radicalization Process of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty,
Perceived Injustice and Perceived Group Threat,” Journal of Social Issues 69:3
(2009): 586-604.
56 Adorno Theodor et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: W.W. Norton,
1950).
57 Bernhard Whitley and Stefania Aegisdottir, “The Gender Belief System,
Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Heterosexual Attitudes Towards
Lesbians and Gay Men,” Sex Roles 42:11 (2000): 947-967.
58 Altemeyer Bob, Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1988); Altemeyer Bob, The
Authoritarian Specter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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who deviate from social norms. Research showed that having an
authoritarian personality is linked to susceptibility to violent extremism,
especially in the case of right-wing extremism.59

Testable propositions
In the present study we test the following three specific hypotheses:
H1: Perceived injustice is indirectly and positively related to
political/religious violence, violent extremist moral beliefs, and the ability
to exercise self-control by enhancing feelings of perceived alienation and
undermining perceptions of procedural justice.
H2: Social integration is indirectly and negatively related to
political/religious violence, violent extremist moral beliefs, and the ability
to exercise self-control preventing perceived alienation and shaping
perceptions of procedural justice.
H3: Perceptions of procedural justice, perceived alienation, and
authoritarianism mediate the relationship between perceived injustice and
social integration on the one hand and violent extremist beliefs and the
ability to exercise self-control on the other hand.

Data & methods
Data and sample description
Data were collected using 1) a classic paper-and-pencil survey among
adolescents in the third cycle of secondary education (ages 16 to 18); and
2) a web survey among students and young adults who have left school
(ages 16–24). The paper-and-pencil study was restricted to Antwerp and
Liège which, apart from Brussels, are the two largest cities in Belgium (+
100,000 inhabitants). All schools in the third cycle of secondary
education were contacted in August and September 2012, for a total of 34
schools in Antwerp and 32 schools in Liège. Only three schools in
Antwerp agreed to hand out the survey. Six additional schools in Antwerp
and another six in Liège agreed to offer the survey online to their students
using their online educational platform. The web survey consists of a selfadministered questionnaire that is conducted online. Access could be
gained through a link on the survey’s web page on Facebook between

De Waele and Pauwels, “Youth Involvement in Politically Motivated Violence;” De
Waele Maarten and Lieven Pauwels, “Right-Wing Extremism and the Use of Violence:
What is the Role of Perceived Injustice and Moral Support?,” in Lieven Pauwels and
Gert Vermeulen (eds.), Update in De Criminologie VII : Actuele Ontwikkelingen
Inzake EU-justitiebeleid, Cannabisbeleid, Misdaad En Straf, Jongeren En
Jeugdzorg, Internationale Vrede, Veiligheid En Gerechtigheid, Gewelddadig
Extremisme & Private Veiligheid En Zelfregulering (Antwerpen: Maklu), 364-392;
Victoroff, “The Mind of a Terrorist.”
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September and December 2012.60 Flyers and posters were distributed in
faculty and university buildings in Antwerp, Ghent, Louvain la Neuve, and
Liège; the central faculties and administrational services for students of all
universities and university colleges of Flanders, Liège, and Louvain la
Neuve were sent an email invitation with a request to circulate the web
link to the questionnaire’s Facebook page. To reach non-studying young
adults, posters were placed in different strategic places that attract a high
number of the target population, such as popular pubs and bars, and many
additional organizations, associations, and local youth clubs were
contacted with a request to distribute the survey among their members.61
A total of 6,020 respondents were reached, including 3,653 in Flanders
and 2,367 in Wallonia. The average age of the respondents was 20 years.
The majority was female (64.7%) with a Belgian native background (both
parents born in Belgium) (76.2%), living in Flanders (60.7%), and selfreported to be religious (54.6%).

Measurement of Constructs
Several scale constructs are used to assess the relationship between
exogenous variables, mediators, and self-reported political/religious
violence. Due to the extensive nature of the concepts, only a general
overview of the scale constructs is presented.62

Dependent Variables
Political/religious violence (alpha: 0.89) was measured by combining
items that asked respondents how often, if ever, they have committed acts
of political/religious violence toward property (e.g., vandalism, throwing
things at the police, etc.) and items that asked respondents how often, if
ever, they have committed acts of political/religious violence toward
persons (e.g., fighting, threatening, etc.). The first set of items was derived
from a Belgian study of nonconventional/illegal political participation by
youth.63 The second set of items was derived from a youth survey
conducted by the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention.64 As this scale is
See facebook.com/radimedonline for the Flemish version and
facebook.com/radimeducl for the French version.
61 A more extensive overview of the data gathering process is outlined in Pauwels,
Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism.
62 A detailed overview of the scale constructs will be provided by the authors upon
request.
63 Claire Gavray, Bernard Fourrnier, and Michel Born, “Nonconventional/Illegal
Participation of Male and Female Youths,” Human Affairs 22:3 (2012): 405-418.
64 Säkerhetspolisen, Valdsam Politisk Extremism: Antidemokratiska Grupperingar
pa Yttersta Höger- Och Vänsterkanten. Stockholm (Säkerhetspolisen, 2009);
Wikström, Per-Olof, Dietrich Oberwittler, Kyle Treiber, and Beth Hardie, Breaking
Rules: The Social and Situational Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime (Oxford:
Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012).
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highly skewed, this variable is dichotomized (0 = never committed an act
of political/religious violence; 1 = committed an act of political/religious
violence at least once).

Exogenous and Independent Variables
Independent variables are drawn from the criminological theories that
were used to construct the integrated model. Because most variables are
highly skewed, all variables were dichotomized except for social
integration and perceived injustice in order to obtain a more accurate
analysis.
The first set of variables entails the mechanisms that are hypothesized to
be directly related to political/religious violence. Violent extremist moral
beliefs (alpha: 0.92) was measured combining three scales measuring
support for religious, left-wing, and right-wing violent extremism. These
items were originally used in a Dutch survey of attitudes toward violent
extremism conducted by Doosje, Loseman, and Van den Bos.65 Low
ability to exercise self-control was measured by combining the following
two subscales: Impulsiveness (alpha: 0.63) and thrill-seeking behavior
(alpha: 0.73). The items for these two scales were taken from the
attitudinal self-control scale used by Grasmick et al. (1993). Exposure to
violent extremist moral settings is measured by a combined index of
active exposure to online violent extremist content entailing online
extremist communication (alpha: 0.69) and actively searching for online
extremist contact (0 = does not seek contact with violent extremist
individuals; 1 = deliberately seeks contact with violent extremist
individuals). Exposure to violent extremist moral settings can occur in the
real world and the virtual world: Violent extremists and terrorist groups
use the Internet for propaganda and recruitment efforts.66 Social media
can be especially important since such media 1) make violent extremist
narratives easily available; and 2) provide the necessary social bonds
where social learning can occur.67 Empirical research has shown that
actively and deliberately searching for online violent extremist
Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Process.”
Josh Adams and Vincint J. Roscigno, “White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture
and the World Wide Web,” Social Forces 84:2 (2005): 759-778; Iftekharul Bashar,
“The Facebook Jihad,” RSIS Commentaries (2012); Deborah Brown and Andrew
Silke, “The Impact of the Media on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,” in Andrew
Silke (ed.), The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2011); Robyn
Torok, “Make a Bomb in Your Mums Kitchen: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of
‘White Moors’ and ‘Home grown Jihadists,’ Paper presented at the Australian
Counter Terrorism Conference (Pert Western Australia).
67 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Jack Newman, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review
of Online Terrorism,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3:3 (2012): 103-122; Robin L.
Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic
Security 4:4 (2011): 167-190.
65
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information, as opposed to passive exposure or accidental encounters, is
especially related to political/religious violence across ideologies.68
Perceived injustice was measured by combining a scale measuring
perceived personal discrimination (alpha: 0.89), or the feeling of being
discriminated against by others in society, and perceived group
discrimination (alpha: 0.95), or the feeling that the group one belongs to is
discriminated against compared to others groups in society. The items
were taken from the study conducted by Doosje, Loseman, and Van den
Bos.69 Social integration addresses the accumulation of low social ties to
key institutions. An overall scale was constructed based on subscales that
refer to attachment to parents (alpha: 0.84), parental monitoring (alpha:
0.82), academic orientation (alpha: 0.80), and school integration (alpha:
0.59).
Finally, a number of variables that are believed to mediate the relationship
between violent extremist moral beliefs and low self-control on the one
hand and “causes of the causes” on the other hand are studied. Religious
authoritarianism refers to extreme dogmatic views with regard to religion.
This scale is based on Althemeyer’s authoritarianism scale (alpha: 0.87).70
Perceived alienation (anomia) is derived from Srole’s study of personal
alienation (alpha: 0.85).71 The scale has been extensively used in the
European social survey. Further, elements of procedural justice are
included. The scales for low procedural justice (alpha: 0.84) and
perceived legitimacy (alpha: 0.80) have previously been used in the
European Social Survey.72 Perceived personal respect (alpha: 0.86) refers
to whether or not an individual feels the authorities treat him or her with
respect and dignity. The items were taken from Doosje, Loseman, and
Van den Bos’ study.73

Analysis Plan
Due to the extreme skewness of some variables and detected nonlinearity
in the data, the dependent variable and independent variables are
Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism.
69 Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Process.”
70 Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter.
71 Srole, “Social Integration and Certain Corollaries.”
72 Mike Hough, Jonathan Jackson, Ben Bradford, Andy Myhill, and Paul Quinton,
“Procedural Justice, Trust and Institutional Legitimacy,” Policing 4:1 (2010): 2032010. The difference between procedural justice and legitimacy is that the justice
variable refers to people’s overall picture of how citizens are treated by the police,
while the legitimacy variable refers to the extent to which people perceive the
authorities as legitimate.
73 Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Processes.”
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categorized (median dichotomization) and a log-linear analysis is
preferred over a linear model. It should be stressed that the results of this
operation did not alter any results, but as the effects are strongest in the
highest category of the variables, it seemed natural to perform a log-linear
model. In order to test the integrated model of political/religious violence,
a series of log-linear path models were run. Path analyses allow for the
testing of both direct and indirect effects. Log-linear path models are
highly suitable for the analysis of categorical data.74 All analyses were
performed using MPlus 7.3. Only the direct effects are presented. The
effect parameters are log odds.75

Results
While different models were run, we have restricted ourselves to the
presentation of the best fitting model. The best fitting model has an
acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.03). RMSEA values below 0.05 are considered
acceptable. The model is shown in Figure 3.

Linda K. Muthén and Bengt O. Muthén, Mplus Statistical Analysis with Latent
Variables: User’s Guide (Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén, 2012).
75 Log odds refer to the changing probability that a subject belongs to a certain category
(e.g., committing political violence versus not committing political/religious violence).
It reflects an increase or decrease in odds. A positive value indicates a positive effect,
while a negative value indicates a negative effect. The interpretation of specific log odds
can be made easier by conversion to odds ratios.
74
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Figure 3: Tested integrated model for the explanation of
political/religious violence (RMSEA = 0.03) 76
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A low ability to exercise self-control (log odds = 0.35), violent extremist
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.19), and active exposure to violent extremist
moral settings (log odds = 0.25) are directly related to political/religious
violence. Both dimensions of violent extremist propensity share a number
of common causes and are still related to each other (0.16). As SAT (in the
situational model) does not assume a causal relationship between violent
extremist beliefs and the ability to exercise self-control with regard to the
explanation of acts of political/religious violence, we did not draw a causal
arrow between both constructs. However, from a developmental point of
view, an increasing number of scholars seem to point to the fact that the
ability to exercise self-control is causally related to moral beliefs.77 A low
ability to exercise self-control (log odds = 0.14) and violent extremist
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.13) are positively related to exposure to violent
extremist moral settings. These results are in line with the key assumption
of situational action theory, identifying both violent extremist propensity
Additional direct paths were found from low legitimacy to active exposure (log odds
= 0.076) and from low legitimacy to low social control (log odds = 0.096). Since these
effects are smaller than 0.1, they are negligible and not displayed here.
77 See contemporary research regarding self-control and offending. Hay, Carter and
Ryan Meldrum, Self-control and Crime Over the Life Course (Thousand Oaks: SAGE
Publications, 2015).
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(low self-control and violent extremist moral beliefs) and (active) exposure
to violent extremist settings as direct key mechanisms explaining
political/religious violence. The interaction between violent extremist
propensity and exposure is not modeled in the present study as we are
interested in both dimensions of violent extremist propensity as
mediators. However, we have previously demonstrated that the effect of
exposure to violent extremist moral settings is conditional on one’s level of
violent extremist propensity.78
In line with our expectations, there is a direct path from perceived
injustice to perceived alienation (log odds = 0.35), authoritarianism (log
odds = 0.5), lack of respect (log odds = 0.78), and low legitimacy (log odds
= 0.13). However, there is also a direct effect on low self-control (log odds
= 0.25), violent extremist moral beliefs (log odds = 0.34), and active
exposure to violent extremist moral settings (log odds = 0.16).
We detected no direct path from social integration to perceived alienation,
although there is a direct effect on lack of personal respect (log odds = 0.49) and low procedural justice (log odds = -0.19). We also observe a
direct path from social integration to low self-control (log odds: -0.56) and
violent extremist moral beliefs (log odds = -0.14).
Perceived alienation mediates the effects of perceived injustice, and there
is a direct path to low self-control (log odds = 0.22), violent extremist
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.19), and low procedural justice (log odds =
0.25). Perceived legitimacy translates social integration indirectly into
political/religious violence through a series of intervening mechanisms:
There is a direct path from lack of respect to procedural justice (log odds =
0.45) and low legitimacy (log odds = 0.26), and low procedural justice is
directly related to low legitimacy (log odds = 0.48). Low legitimacy is
directly related to political/religious violence (log odds = 0.14). This is in
line with a key assumption of procedural justice theory (Tyler, 2006).
Finally, authoritarianism is directly related to violent extremist moral
beliefs (log odds = 0.28), low self-control (log odds = 0.17), and exposure
to violent extremist moral settings (log odds = 0.15).

Discussion & Conclusion
These findings demonstrate that political/religious violence directly stems
from moral violent extremist beliefs, a low ability to exercise self-control,
and exposure to violent extremist moral settings. This is in line with SAT.
The present study was not only interested in the mechanisms that can
Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism.
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directly affect the likelihood of political/religious violence, but also in the
“causes of the causes,” which influence these direct mechanisms. The
results of this study prove the feasibility and additional value of theoretical
integration. By logically integrating different frameworks, a more
comprehensive explanation of political/religious violence became possible
by identifying different, but equally valid, causal pathways. This supports
our claim that in order to advance research, researchers should move
beyond vicious debates on which competing theory is wright or wrong and
instead search for complementarity and integrated models.
We found that perceived injustice and social integration can be seen as
important factors that indirectly bring about political/religious violence by
influencing violent extremist moral beliefs and evoking active exposure to
violent extremist moral settings. Next to enhancing authoritarianism,
perceived injustice also strongly affects feelings of perceived alienation.
Alienation itself is a part of a causal chain as it weakens personal levels of
self-control, increases violent extremist moral beliefs, and negatively
influences perceptions of procedural justice. Together with social
integration, perceived injustice also increases the feeling that one lacks
respect. This lack of respect, together with perceived alienation, leads to
low procedural justice and eventually the perception of the authorities as
being illegitimate, not sharing the same values, and thus not to be obeyed.
This is important since this lack of legitimacy undermines compliance and
confidence and thus directly enhances the chance of committing
political/religious violence.79 In short, perceived alienation and perceived
legitimacy both play a major role in translating experienced strains into
violent extremist propensity and exposure to violent extremist settings.
Research has often focused on the individual characteristics when
explaining violent extremism, but ignored the wider circumstances and
context in which this individual develops.80 So far, socioeconomic
deprivation has received a lot of attention from researchers without much
result. Research trying to uncover socio-demographic profiles of violent
extremists and terrorists only found mixed and contradicting results.
Focusing on perceived injustice can put these results in perspective since
feelings of injustice can be present among all layers of society. The
perception of injustice by the individual, whether toward himself or the
group, is what can link more macro-level social facts, such as poverty and

Michael D. Reisig, Jason Bratton, and Marc G. Gertz, “The Construct Validity and
Refinement of Process-based Policing Measures,” Criminal Justice and Behavior
34:8 (2007): 1005-1028; Tyler, Why People Obey the Law.
80 Rik Coolsaet, “What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the
Belgian Case,” Egmont Paper 75.
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inequality, to individual responses, such as political/religious violence.81
This means violent extremism cannot be explained by mere socioeconomical characteristics of certain groups or individuals, but is
ultimately rooted in social conditions that trigger different individual
characteristics, such as perceptions of injustice, which may in turn trigger
mechanisms of recalibration.82 This is partially backed up by recent
research on foreign fighters, which often locates the starting point in
experiences of strain and feelings of indignation and being lost, resulting
in personal estrangement from society.83
It would be helpful here to provide some methodological concluding
remarks. Our analysis is based on cross-sectional data, providing only a
snapshot of what is likely to be a complex and interrelated phenomena.
Although we do consider our results to be useful and of great relevance in
an otherwise fragmented research field, we must allow for some nuance
when interpreting the results. Furthermore, our study looked at rightwing, left-wing, and Islamic violent extremism simultaneously. A separate
test of the model for each of these types of violent extremism is
recommended to strengthen the general claim of the model. It is also not
clear to what extent such a model would be applicable to other types of
violent extremism, such as single-issue extremism. In addition, our study
is limited to the Belgian context. It is advisable for future research to test
the model in other social and political contexts. Future studies should also
try to uncover the broader social, political, and economic contexts and
conditions under which feelings of injustice and poor ties to society
develop.
Finally, the present study has some limitations to take into account. First,
using this theoretical framework, the variation in political/religious
violence could only be partially addressed, meaning that the theoretical
framework is incomplete. Second, the study relies on cross-sectional data,
which are not optimal for making causal inferences as causes and effects
are measured simultaneously. Future research should consider
longitudinal designs. In this respect, much can be learned from gang
research.84 Third, although the web survey has considerably contributed
to the survey response, some disadvantages have to be kept in mind. The
researcher cannot completely monitor the process of response selection or
James A. Piazza, “Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism,” Conflict
Management and Peace Science 29:5 (November 2012): 521-546; James A; Piazza,
“Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism,” Journal of
Peace Research 48:3 (May 2011): 339-353.
82 Coolsaet, “What Drives Europeans to Syria”.
83 Ibid; Loobuyck Pieter (ed.), De Lokroep van IS: Syriëstrijders en
(De)Radicalisering (Uitgeverij Pelckmans, 2015).
84 Decker, Scott and Pyrooz, David. "Gangs, Terrorism, and Radicalization," Journal
of Strategic Security 4: 4 (2011): 151-166.
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the conditions under which the questionnaire is completed (the presence
of others, anonymity, etc.). It is unclear to what extent our data are biased
by this method of data collection.85

See also Sonia Lucia, Leslie Herrmann, and Martin Killias, “How Important Are
Interview Methods and Questionnaire Designs in Research on Self-Reported Juvenile
Delinquency?,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 3:1 (2007): 39-60; Sean E.
McCabe, Carol C. Boyd, Amy Young, Scott Crawford, and Duston Pope, “Mode Effects
for Collecting Alcohol and Tobacco Data among 3rd and 4th Grade Students,”
Addictive Behaviors 30:4 (2005): 663-671.
85

91
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1491

